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Abstract
This paper finds that it is optimal to start a long-term emission-reduction stra-
tegy with significant short-term abatement investment, even if the optimal car-
bon price starts low and grows progressively over time. Moreover, optimal mar-
ginal abatement investment costs differ across sectors of the economy. It may
be preferable to spend $25 to avoid the marginal ton of carbon in a sector where
abatement capital is expensive, such as public transportation, or in a sector with
large abatement potential, such as the power sector, than $15 for the marginal
ton in a sector with lower cost or lower abatement potential. The reason, dis-
tinct from learning spillovers, is that reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires
investment in long-lived abatement capital such as clean power plants or public
transport infrastructure. The value of abatement investment comes from avoi-
ded emissions, but also from the value of abatement capital in the future. The
optimal levelized cost of conserved carbon can thus be higher than the optimal
carbon price. It is higher in sectors with higher investment needs: those where
abatement capital is more expensive or sectors with larger abatement potential.
We compare our approach to the traditional abatement-cost-curve model and
discuss implications for policy design.
Highlights
The same carbon price translates into different abatement investment costs
in different sectors
Sectors with higher emissions and more expensive abatement capital should
invest more dollars per abated ton
Abatement cost curves cannot be used to model abatement options that
require investment in low-carbon capital
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National governments committed to stabilize climate change to mitigate sub-
sequent damages (G7, 2015; UNFCCC, 2016). This will require transitioning
from an economy based on polluting capital, such as inefficient buildings and
polluting cars, to an economy based on clean capital, such as retrofitted buil-
dings or electric vehicles. A critical question for public policy is to determine
the optimal cost and timing of such abatement investment. Is action as urgent
as frequently advocated? A second important issue is the optimal allocation
of abatement. There are many options to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions, from renewable power plants to improved building insulation and more
efficient cars. Each of these options has a cost, and would reduce emissions by
a certain amount. Should mitigation start with the least expensive options and
progressively clean the economy by ascending cost order?
To shed light on these questions, we study the optimal timing, cost, and
sectoral allocation of abatement investment. We capture the transition to clean
capital using a parsimonious abatement investment model with three basic fea-
tures. First, emission reductions require investment that has long-lasting effects
on emissions. For instance, once a building is retrofitted with better insula-
tion, emissions from that building are lowered for decades. Second, we take
into account the limited ability of an economy to switch from carbon-intensive
to low-carbon capital overnight. We model this with convex investment costs,
sometimes called adjustment costs in the theory of investment (Lucas, 1967;
Gould, 1968). They capture increasing opportunity costs to use scarce resour-
ces such as skilled workers and appropriate capital to perform abatement in-
vestment. For instance, retrofitting all buildings in a country in three months
would be much more expensive than doing it over three decades. Third, we
take into account that different GHG emissions in each sector mean different
abatement potentials in each sector. Once all the buildings are energy neutral,
no more GHG can be saved in the building sector; and if every coal power plant
is replaced with renewable power, the abatement potential of the power sector
is depleted.
This paper is the first to disentangle the optimal carbon price, the optimal
timing of emission reduction, and the optimal abatement investment pathways
in a multi-sector analytical model. Our analysis brings three main findings.
First, while the optimal carbon price increases over time (a familiar result), the
optimal abatement investment profile is bell-shaped or even strictly decreasing;
in particular, a growing carbon price is compatible with significant short-term
investment. Second, optimal marginal abatement investment costs, expressed
in dollars invested per discounted abated ton of carbon (a metric called the
levelized cost of conserved carbon, or sometimes simply the marginal abatement
cost), can be higher than the carbon price. Third, the levelized cost of conserved
carbon should be higher in sectors where abatement capital is more expensive
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and sectors with higher abatement potential.
These results provide counter-intuitive policy guidance, as they suggest that
more investments should be done in the sectors with higher costs, and that
optimal investment may start higher than what the carbon price would suggest.
For instance, when abatement options are presented in a marginal abatement
cost curve a` la McKinsey and Company (2009), it may be desirable to implement
some of the “expensive” measures on the right-hand side of the curve, even if
their cost appears higher than the carbon price, or higher than the cost of
alternative abatement options in the curve. In a numerical simulation, we find
that an abatement option at 25 $/tCO2 in the industrial sector may be preferable
to a 15 $/tCO2 option in the building sector, because the industrial sector is both
more expensive to decarbonize and has a greater abatement potential than the
building sector.1
The reason is that to cope with the exponentially-increasing carbon price,
all sectors are eventually decarbonized. And in each sector, two factors drive
the optimal speed at which to deploy abatement capital to reach this goal: the
magnitude of the transition to zero carbon, captured by the abatement poten-
tial; and the availability of appropriate resources (skilled workers and production
lines), captured by adjustment costs. At any point in time, sectors where unaba-
ted emissions are higher and sectors where abatement capital is more expensive
should receive more abatement investment, to smooth their transition and re-
duce adjustment costs. The intuition why the value of abatement investment
differs across sectors is as follows. Abatement investment reduces emissions and
transmits abatement capital to the future. Therefore, the current value of aba-
tement investment (and the levelized cost of conserved carbon) depends on two
factors: the carbon price, which is the same in all sectors, and the value of aba-
tement capital in the future, which is greater in sectors with higher investment
needs, that is those facing higher emissions or higher adjustment costs.
Our findings contrast with those from the literature on the optimal timing of
GHG emission reductions. Since the seminal contributions by Nordhaus (1991,
1992), which have established the DICE model as a reference framework for
studying this question (Dietz and Stern, 2014), studies have found that abate-
ment effort should start low and grow over time. The reason is that in DICE,
abatement can be chosen at each point in time on an abatement cost curve,
independently of previous abatement (see Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013 and Ap-
pendix G). In a model based on abatement cost curves, the optimal carbon
price, the quantity of abatement and the abatement cost increase together over
time. In particular, contemporaneous mitigation action, relevant for today’s
decision makers, is desirable only if today’s carbon price is high enough. Ad-
vocates of early voluntarism in climate mitigation, such as Stern (2006), have
thus proposed modifications in DICE that would result in higher carbon pri-
ces, hence higher abatement in the short term (Dietz and Stern, 2014; Espagne
1 As explained below, these numbers should not be directly interpreted as policy recom-
mendations, because simulations adopt a short time horizon and are based on limited data.
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et al., 2012). Compared to a model based on abatement cost curves, abatement
investment allows disentangling the optimal carbon price, the optimal cost of
emission reductions, and the optimal timing of emission reductions.
We illustrate this difference with a numerical comparison of an abatement-
cost-curve model and an abatement-investment model, calibrated with the same
sectoral costs and potentials from IPCC data, and with the same economy-wide
carbon budget. While the two models almost agree on the optimal carbon price,
they lead to radically different emission reductions and abatement effort in the
short term. The abatement-cost-curve model recommends spending 100 billion
dollars on mitigation the first year and, somewhat unrealistically, to reduce as
much as 12 GtCO2 that same year (about forty percent of global emissions).
In contrast, the abatement-investment model recommends spending 300 billion
dollars the first year, while reducing less than 1 GtCO2. The abatement in-
vestment framework is the only one to acknowledge that substantial emission
reductions cannot happen overnight, but still require substantial short-term in-
vestment. It reconciles the growing shadow price of carbon with the need for
immediate and significant abatement investment stressed by the international
community (e.g., NCE, 2014; IPCC, 2014b; World Bank, 2015).
Other analytical papers have also concluded that it can make sense to invest
early in the transition to a low-carbon economy, but the literature has tended to
focus on the role of knowledge accumulation. If abatement brings a second be-
nefit in the form of knowledge, then abatement effort should generally be larger
than what the carbon price alone would suggest (Wigley et al., 1996; Goul-
der and Mathai, 2000; Popp, 2004; Kverndokk and Rosendahl, 2007; Acemoglu
et al., 2012). And when comparing two competing abatement technologies, such
as solar versus wind, society should spend more in technologies more prone to
learning spillovers (Rosendahl, 2004; Bramoulle´ and Olson, 2005; del Rio Gon-
zalez, 2008). Our analysis provides a different rationale for investing early and
discriminating between emission-reduction options: it shows a need for early
investment in capital that will take time to deploy, especially in sectors with
large baseline emissions or large abatement costs. The distinction is important:
a given sector, such as maybe public transportation, can be subject to negligible
learning dynamics, while still requiring early action for the reasons exposed in
this paper. And operational consequences differ: putting researchers to work
on better wind turbines and starting to deploy wind turbines are not the same
things.2
2 There are other differences between capital and knowledge accumulation. For instance,
knowledge accumulation can continue to reduce costs once emissions are entirely abated, but
it does not make sense to accumulate more abatement capital than what suffice to reduce
emissions down to zero. Spillovers is a prominent feature of most knowledge accumulation
related to climate mitigation, while private ownership is a feature of most power plants,
vehicles and buildings, clean or dirty. In addition, a key component of capital is its turnover
rate, which is not necessarily linked to the obsolescence of the knowledge used to built it (as
illustrated by old bridges and buildings in use in Europe). It remains an avenue for further
research to account for the two phenomena in a single model.
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Finally, our results provide theoretical insights to reinterpret previous nu-
merical results. Several studies using complex Integrated Assessment Model
(IAMs) stress the importance of aligning short-term emission reduction action
with long-term emission reduction targets: given the limited ability of econo-
mies to switch overnight to low-carbon technologies, if short-term efforts are
too modest, subsequent efforts will need to be much higher (Iyer et al., 2014;
Riahi et al., 2015; IPCC, 2014b). Further, several authors have shown that what
matters is not only the amount of short-term effort, but also in which sectors
it happens (Lecocq et al., 1998; Jaccard and Rivers, 2007; Vogt-Schilb et al.,
2015).3 By using an analytically tractable model, this paper clarifies that short-
term emission reduction expenses need to be higher than what the carbon price
alone suggests, and should focus in the sectors that will be more difficult to de-
carbonize. It also clarifies that effort may mean two different things: expenses
and emission reductions. We show that sectors where abatement investment is
more expensive should receive more abatement expenses (in $/tCO2), without
necessarily generating more emission reductions (in tCO2) than sectors where
reductions are cheaper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 presents the abatement invest-
ment model. Section 2 derives results concerning the optimal timing of abate-
ment investment. Section 3 examines the optimal cost of emission reductions.
Section 4 investigates the optimal allocation of abatement investment across
sectors. Section 5 compares abatement investment and abatement cost curves
with numerical illustrations calibrated with IPCC data. Section 6 concludes.
1. Model
A social planner (or an equivalent well-functioning market facing the socially-
optimal carbon price) needs to constrain cumulative GHG emissions below a
given ceiling, or carbon budget B. The carbon budget B can be interpreted
as the allowable emissions to stabilize global warming to a given temperature
target (IPCC, 2014b), or as a tipping point beyond which the environment is
catastrophically damaged. This keeps the model as simple as possible, and
allows us to focus on the dynamics of emission reductions costs, keeping the
dynamics of climate change and climate damages out — that is abstracting
from the benefits of emission reductions.4
3 These papers use toy numerical models. We are unaware of any IAM study reaching this
conclusion yet.
4 The ideal approach to determine the initial price of carbon is to perform a cost-benefit
analysis. Due to the various scientific uncertainties surrounding climate change and resulting
damages, assessing the benefits from climate mitigation is not straightforward (Manne and
Richels, 1992; Ambrosi et al., 2003; Stern, 2013; Pindyck, 2013), and it is common to use tar-
gets expressed in global warming (such as the 2◦C target from the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, or any other temperature target), or, similarly, cumulative
emissions also known as carbon budgets (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009; Zickfeld
et al., 2009). Appendix B shows that the results exposed in this paper hold under cost-benefit
analysis.
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We denote mt the cumulative atmospheric emissions at date t. The emis-
sion dynamics and carbon budget read (dotted variables represent temporal
derivatives):
m0 given
m˙t = εref − at
mt ≤ B
(1)
Where εref represents baseline emissions, and at represents abatement at time
t. Baseline emissions εref can also be interpreted as the maximum abatement
potential, in the sense that
∀t, at ≤ εref (2)
To reduce emissions, one must invest in abatement capital, which has a long-
lived effect on emissions. Borrowing the wording by Davis and Socolow (2014),
investment in electric vehicles or building retrofitting is a hard commitment to
emit less GHG during the lifetime of this equipment. For simplicity, abatement
capital is directly measured in terms of avoided emissions, and baseline emissions
are assumed constant (this assumption is relaxed later). We also assume the
stock of abatement capital starts at zero (without loss of generality). None of
these three simplifying assumptions are essential to derive our results, but they
considerably ease exposition, allowing us to focus on relevant insights instead
of technical details.
At each time step t, the positive amount of abatement investment xt adds
to the abatement capital stock at, which otherwise depreciates at rate δ:
at0 = 0 (3)
a˙t = xt − δat (4)
Abatement investment costs c(xt), where the function c is positive, increasing,
differentiable and convex:
∀xt, c′′(xt) > 0
c′(xt) ≥ 0
c(xt) ≥ 0
(5)
c′(xt) is referred to as the marginal abatement investment cost. The convex-
ity of the abatement investment cost c, sometimes referred to as adjustment
costs (Lucas, 1967; Gould, 1968), captures increasing opportunity costs to use
scarce resources (skilled workers and appropriate capital) to build and deploy
abatement capital. As noted by Mussa (1977), c′(xt) can simply be seen as the
marginal cost curve for the industry that supplies abatement investment — e.g.,
clean vehicle manufacturers or insulation contractors.
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For instance, xt is the pace — measured in buildings per year — at which
old buildings are being retrofitted at date t (the abatement at would then be
proportional to the share of retrofitted buildings in the stock). Retrofitting
buildings at a given pace requires to pay a given number of scarce skilled workers.
If workers are hired in the merit order and paid at the marginal productivity,
the marginal price of retrofitting buildings c′(xt) is an increasing function of
the pace xt. The cost c(xt) may also be interpreted as the net present cost of
building and operating low-carbon capital (e.g., an electric vehicle) instead of,
or in replacement for, polluting capital.
The social planner (or equivalent decentralized procedure) chooses when
to perform abatement investment in order to meet a carbon budget at the
lowest inter-temporal cost, under the constraint set by the maximum abatement
potential εref :
min
xt
∫ ∞
0
e−rtc(xt) dt (6)
subject to mt ≤ B (φt)
m˙t = εref − at (µt)
a˙t = xt − δat (νt)
at ≤ εref (λt)
Importantly, one does not control directly abatement at, but abatement invest-
ment xt, linked to the temporal derivative of at. For instance, one controls and
pays for a number of buildings to retrofit each year, which indirectly translates
to a total share of retrofitted buildings in the stock, which in turn translates
to reduced GHG emissions flows. The Greek letters in parentheses are the co-
state variables and Lagrangian multipliers (chosen in current value and such
that they are positive): νt is the shadow value of abatement capital, µt is the
shadow cost of carbon emissions, and λt is the shadow cost of the maximum
abatement potential εref , that quantifies the scarcity of investment opportuni-
ties. In the following, we refer to co-state variables and Lagrangian multipliers
as “prices”, instead of “shadow prices”, for short.
2. Optimal timing of abatement investment
We start the resolution of problem 6 from the steady state. The cumulative
emission ceiling B is reached at an endogenous date T . After T , emissions net
of abatement are nill, meaning that the abatement potential εref is reached,
and abatement investment only compensates for depreciation (Appendix A):
∀t ≥ T, mt = B
=⇒ at = εref
=⇒ xt = δεref
(7)
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Before T , the optimal shadow price of carbon µt increases at the discount
rate r (Appendix A demonstrates this familiar result):
∀t < T, µt = µert (8)
The initial carbon price, µt0 , is endogenously chosen at the lowest value such
that the carbon budget is met. The exponentially-increasing carbon price is
reminiscent of an Hotelling rule. It ensures that the present value of the carbon
price is constant along the optimal path until full decarbonization, such that
the social planner (or the market) is indifferent between one unit of abatement
at any two dates.5
Before T, emissions are strictly positive, abatement capital is lower than its
potential at < εref , and optimal investment dynamics are described by the first
order condition (Appendix A) :
∀t < T, (r + δ) c′(xt)− dc
′(xt)
dt
= µert (9)
We call the left hand side of (9) the marginal implicit rental cost of capital,
adapting to the case of endogenous capacity prices the concept of implicit ren-
tal cost of capital first proposed by Jorgenson (1967). It is the rental price
that ensures agents would be indifferent between buying abatement capacity at
c′(xt) or renting it at the rental price.6 Equation (9) thus simply means that
if there was a well-functioning market for abatement capital, the rental cost of
abatement capital would be equal to the carbon price.
For instance, consider a taxi company that meets a fixed demand for travel,
rents the vehicles it uses, and pays a carbon tax on the carbon it emits. Consider
the taxi company faces two similar vehicles available for rent, differing only in
their carbon emissions and rental price. Equation 9 suggests the company will
chose the cleaner vehicle for a given year if and only if the difference in rental
costs (in dollars per vehicle per year) is lower or equal to avoided emissions (in
tons of carbon per year per vehicle) valued at the carbon price that year (in
dollars per ton).
The exponentially-increasing carbon price then influences indirectly abate-
ment investment. In particular it does not translate into increasing abatement
investment:
5 What we will show in section 4 is that this Hotelling rule does not translate to a straight-
forward Herfindhal principle: that is, abatement opportunities should not be exploited starting
with those that have the lowest levelized cost of conserved carbon.
6 The expression of the rental price translates that there is no profitable tradeoff between
the two following strategies: (i) buy capital at t at a cost ci
′(xi,t), rent it out during one period
dt at the rental price, then sell the depreciated (δ) capacities at t + dt at a price c′i(xi,t) +
d
dt
c′i(xi,t)dt or (ii) simply lend money at the interest rate r (Jorgenson, 1967). Appendix D
proposes an alternative explanation of the marginal implicit rental cost of abatement capital.
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Figure 1: The carbon price and the two possible optimal abatement investment pathways.
While the carbon price grows exponentially over time, the optimal abatement investment cost
(r + δ)c′(xt), and thus optimal investment xt, may either draw a bell shape or decrease over
time.
Proposition 1. Along the optimal path, investment is either bell-shaped or de-
creasing over time, and so is the optimal marginal investment cost.
Proof. See Appendix A for a formal proof. As a sketch, equation 9 may be
re-arranged as:
∀t < T, dc
′(xt)
dt
= (r + δ) c′(xt)− µert (10)
Fig. 1 plots the carbon price µert and two possible cases of (r + δ) c′ against
time t. In the upper region, (r + δ) c′ > µert, implying that dc′(xt)/dt > 0. In
the lower region, (r + δ) c′ < µert, implying that dc′(xt)/dt < 0.
The strictly decreasing profile happens for stringent climate targets, that
is for high carbon prices compared to abatement investment costs µ  (r +
δ) c′ (δεref ) (see Fig. 1). The bell shaped profile happens for low carbon prices
or high investment costs µ (r + δ) c′ (δεref ).7 
Prop. 1 means that taking into account two simple aspects of abatement
investment — adjustment costs and finite abatement potential — in a model
with a single externality — climate change in the absence of learning spillo-
vers — is sufficient to reconcile the views that the optimal policy is a growing
carbon price and that early investment is needed to stabilize climate change.8
Fig. 2 illustrates how such bell-shaped abatement investment translates into an
7 The threshold value corresponds to the case where µ = (r + δ)c′(x0). Such condition is
not easily linked analytically to the parameters of the model because x0 is endogenous.
8 Simple calculations show that each feature separately does not provide similar results;
only the combination of both adjustment costs and a maximum abatement potential leads to
a transition with bell-shaped investment. If one assumes that investment costs are not strictly
convex, that is ∀x, c′(x) = C, then the optimal schedule is to cap all emissions in a bang bang
fashion at the date t when µert = (r + δ)C. A model without abatement potential would be
unbounded. Without a maximum abatement potential, an exponential carbon price would
result in exponentially growing investment, the total stock of abatement capital would also
grow exponentially towards infinity, and emissions will decrease towards negative infinity.
9
Figure 2: Optimal timing of abatement investment and resulting abatement pathway. Left:
Abatement investment is bell-shaped. Right: Abatement continuously grows over time.
increasing abatement pathway — Appendix A formally demonstrates that at
increases steadily to εref .
There is some evidence that optimal investment in long-lived capital can
actually be bell-shaped. For instance, Lecocq and Shalizi (2014) report bell-
shaped investment pathways in the case of the transition to nuclear power in
France and the building of the national interstate highways in the United States.
3. Optimal cost of abatement investment
3.1. Optimal marginal abatement investment costs
When emission reduction requires abatement investment, the carbon price is
only one of two parts of the information required to value abatement investment:
Proposition 2. Before full decarbonization, the optimal marginal cost of aba-
tement investment c′(xt) equals the sum of two terms: (1) the value of avoided
emissions before the maximum abatement potential is reached; and (2) the cost
of maintaining abatement capital over the long-term, after emissions have rea-
ched zero.
Proof. The solution of the differential equation (9) is (Appendix A):
∀t < T, c′(xt) =
∫ T
t
µerθe−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(T−t) c′ (δεref ) (11)
In equation 11, output from the marginal unit of abatement capital e−(δ+r)(θ−t)
is valued at the carbon price µerθ before T , and c′ (δεref ) is the value of abate-
ment capital at T . 
Proposition 2 means that optimal investment in abatement capacity cannot
be decided based only on the carbon price, investors have to anticipate a full
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decarbonization strategy. Take the example of a firm that builds cleaner perso-
nal vehicles with the intent of renting them to a taxi company facing a carbon
price. When deciding how many vehicles to build at a given date, and at what
cost, the manufacturer cannot rely only on the current carbon price, nor even
only on the full carbon price schedule. The car manufacturer has to anticipate
its full investment pathway, including the date T when all taxi vehicles will
have been replaced by cleaner vehicles, and the cost of replacing these cleaner
vehicles after T . In particular, the optimal cost of a clean vehicle is not equal
to the value of future avoided emissions.
The marginal abatement investment cost c′(xt) represents the optimal cost
of physical capital used to reduce emissions. For instance, it could be expres-
sed in dollars per building retrofitted, or dollars per vehicle replaced with an
electric vehicle. When seeing this equipment as abatement capital, one unit
of capital, e.g. an electric vehicle, translates into a flux of emission reductions,
e.g. 1 tCO2/yr. As a result, c
′(xt) is to be expressed in dollars per ton of avoi-
ded carbon per year ($/(tCO2/yr)). Because the marginal investment cost c
′(xt)
says nothing about the lifetime of abatement capital, it does not inform directly
on the amount of GHG saved thanks to a marginal investment xtdt. An alter-
native metric to measure abatement investment is the levelized cost of avoided
carbon emissions, which compares investment costs to discounted committed
emission reductions, as discussed in the following subsection.
3.2. An operational metric? The levelized cost of conserved carbon
A natural metric to measure and compare the cost of abatement investments
in different options (e.g electric vehicles versus retrofitting buildings) is the ratio
of (i) the cost of building and using a given option (e.g in $) to (ii) the discounted
sum of GHG emissions avoided thanks to that option (e.g in tCO2). This ratio
is widely used to compare abatement options, for instance to build marginal
abatement cost curves, and is then simply called “marginal abatement cost”
(McKinsey and Company, 2009; Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte, 2014). The IPCC
(2014a) calls this ratio the Levelized Cost of Conserved Carbon (LCCC).
Definition 1. We call Levelized Cost of Conserved Carbon (LCCC) the ratio
of marginal investment to the corresponding discounted abatement.
The LCCC `t expresses in dollars per ton. It reads `t = (r + δ) c
′(xt) (Appendix
C).
Practitioners often use the LCCC when comparing and assessing abatement
investments (IPCC, 2014a), for instance replacing conventional cars with electric
vehicles (EV). Assume the additional cost of an EV built at time t, compared
to the cost of a conventional car, is 7 000 $/EV. If cars are driven 13 000 km/yr
and electric cars emit 110 gCO2/km less than a comparable internal combustion
engine vehicle, each EV allows to save 1.43 tCO2/yr. The abatement investment
cost in this case would be 4 900 $/(tCO2/yr). If electric cars depreciate at a
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constant rate such that their average lifetime is 10 years (1/δ = 10 yr) and the
discount rate is 5%/yr , then r + δ = 15%/yr and the LCCC is 730 $/tCO2.
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LCCCs are homogeneous to a carbon price, and, unlike the marginal ren-
tal cost of abatement capital, they fully characterize an investment pathway.10
They are a straightforward measure of abatement investment, as they relate
how much is invested in the marginal unit of abatement capital to the emission
reduction resulting from this marginal investment. It may thus be counter-
intuitive that LCCCs should not be equal to the carbon price. As stated before,
the reason is that the value of abatement investment comes from both reduced
emissions and the value of abatement capital in the future — Appendix D shows
how an investment strategy aiming at reducing emissions without changing the
future stock of abatement capital would simply equalize the marginal implicit
rental cost of capital to the carbon price. Indeed, another way of reading (9) is:
`t = (r + δ) c
′(xt) = µert +
dc′(xt)
dt
(12)
Equation (12) means that the optimal value of abatement capital, expressed
using the levelized cost of capital `t, equals the carbon price µe
rt plus the
current variation of the value of abatement capital dc
′(xt)
dt . When the value
of abatement capital is increasing over time
(
dc′(xt)
dt > 0
)
, the optimal LCCC
is higher than the carbon price. This happens, if ever, at the beginning of the
transition (Fig. 1). When the value of abatement capital decreases over time, the
optimal LCCC is lower than the carbon price. This happen in a second phase of
the transition, when the abatement potential is close to be depleted (Fig. 1). In
the following we analyze how in a multi-sector economy, the temporal evolution
of the value of abatement capital differs across sectors, and thus the optimal
LCCC differs across sectors.
4. Optimal sectoral allocation of abatement investment
In this section, we extend the model of abatement capital accumulation
to investigate optimal allocation of abatement investment across sectors. The
economy is partitioned in a set of sectors indexed by i. Each sector is described
by baseline emissions, that set an abatement potential a¯i, a depreciation rate
δi, and a cost function ci. For simplicity, we assume that abatement in each
sector does not interact with the others.11 To make sure the problem is feasible,
9 The investment cost was computed as 7 000 $/(1.43 tCO2/yr) = 4 895 $/(tCO2/yr); and
the levelized cost as 0.15 yr−1 · 4 895 $/(tCO2/yr)= 734 $/tCO2.
10 Investment xt can be calculated from the LCCC `t as xt = c′−1
(
`t
r+δ
)
. This contrasts
with the rental cost of abatement capital, which defines a differential equation that has to be
completed with a boundary condition to define a single investment pathway (A.12).
11 This is not entirely realistic, for instance abatement realized in the power sector may
actually increase the potential and reduce the cost to implement abatement in other sectors
thanks to electrification (Williams et al., 2012; Audoly et al., 2017).
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we assume that all emissions can be abated
∑
i a¯i = εref . The maximization
program becomes:
min
xi,t
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
∑
i
ci(xi,t) dt (13)
subject to a˙i,t = xi,t − δi ai,t (νi,t)
ai,t ≤ a¯i (λi,t)
m˙t =
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) (µt)
mt ≤ B (φt)
The value of abatement capital νi,t and the cost of the sectoral potentials λi,t
now depend on the sector i, while there is still a single carbon price µt for the
whole economy.
Similarly to the case with a single sector, the implicit rental cost in each
sector is equal to the single current carbon price (see Appendix E).
∀i, ∀t < Ti, (r + δi) ci′(xi,t)− dci
′(xi,t)
dt
= µert (14)
But the single implicit rental cost translates into different investment costs
across sectors:
Proposition 3. Each sector i is decarbonized at a different date Ti, and the
optimal marginal investment cost is different in each sector:
∀i, ∀t < Ti,
ci
′(xi,t) =
∫ Ti
t
µerθe−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(Ti−t) c′i (δia¯i) (15)
Proof. Equation 15 is the generalization of equation 11 to the case of several
sectors (Appendix E). 
In Fig. 1, the two pathways may now be seen as corresponding to two diffe-
rent sectors facing the same carbon price. Notice that the area below the green
curve is larger than the area below the red curve. This means that the green
sector faces higher investment needs in dollars, for instance because it has a
higher abatement potential or a higher nominal investment cost than the red
sector.
Which sectors should receive more investment? Loosely speaking, (15) shows
that the value of abatement capital depends on the economy-wide carbon price
during the transition to low-carbon capital, and then on the cost of maintaining
emissions to zero in that sector. The duration of the transition, Ti, and the long-
run maintenance cost c′i (δia¯i), both depend on the sector i. Intuitively, for the
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carbon budget to be met, the carbon price must set a cost higher than the long-
run maintenance cost of low carbon capital in all sectors, otherwise it would
be more economic to pay the carbon price than to switch to zero emissions.
Considering all these factors, more abatement investment should go to sectors
that are more difficult to decarbonize, in the sense that they will take longer to
transition to zero emissions and/or that they face higher maintenance cost in
the long run. In the following, we formally derive some conditions for a sector
to be more difficult to decarbonize.
Corollary 1. Along the optimal path, investment costs are higher (i) in sectors
with larger abatement potential:(
δi = δj , a¯i > a¯j and ∀y, c′i(y) = c′j(y)
)
=⇒ ∀t, ci′(xi,t) > cj ′(xj,t)
and (ii) in sectors where abatement capital is nominally more expensive:(
δi = δj , a¯i = a¯j and ∀y, c′i(y) > c′j(y)
)
=⇒ ∀t, ci′(xi,t) > cj ′(xj,t)
Proof. Appendix E.1
The intuition behind Coroll. 1 is the following. The value of abatement inves-
tment comes from avoided emissions and from the future value of abatment
capital. The future value of abatement capital is greater in sectors where future
investment needs are greater. These are the sectors with larger baseline emissi-
ons (as more abatement investment is then required to decarbonize them); and
— maybe more surprisingly — sectors where abatement capital is more expen-
sive, as these sectors also need to invest more money to be fully decarbonized.
Appendix E.2 relaxes the assumption that baseline emissions are constant in
all sectors, and shows that the general result holds: marginal investment costs
differ across sectors, and they should be higher in the sectors that are more
difficult to decarbonize. Relaxing the assumption of constant emissions just
means that it may be less straightforward to determine which sectors are more
difficult to decarbonize.
Interestingly, the ranking established by Coroll. 1 holds when measuring
marginal investment costs with the levelized cost of conserved carbon:
Corollary 2. Everything else being equal, optimal levelized costs of conserved
carbon (LCCC) are higher (i) in sectors with larger abatement potential:
δi = δj , a¯i > a¯j and ∀y, c′i(y) = c′j(y)
=⇒ ∀t, (r + δi)ci′(xi,t) > (r + δj)cj ′(xj,t)
and (ii) in sectors where abatement capital is nominally more expensive:
δi = δj , a¯i = a¯j and ∀y, c′i(y) > c′j(y)
=⇒ ∀t, (r + δi)ci′(xi,t) > (r + δj)cj ′(xj,t)
Proof. This corollary is a direct consequence of Coroll. 1. 
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Corollary 2 provides counter-intuitive policy guidance, as it suggests that more
investments should be done in the sectors with higher abatement investment
costs. This result is relevant when designing an abatement strategy. For in-
stance, when abatement options are presented in a marginal abatement cost
curves a` la McKinsey and Company (2009), it may be desirable to implement
some of the “expensive” measures on the right-hand side of the curve, even
if their LCCC is higher than the carbon price, and higher than the LCCC of
alternative abatement options.
Coroll. 2 does not mean that different sectors should face different carbon
prices; Appendix F confirms that, in the absence of any other market failure,
a single carbon price can decentralize the social optimum. If a government is
able to impose the optimal carbon price schedule in a perfectly credible fashion
to a well-functioning forward-looking economy, the market will perform the
socially-optimal amount of abatement investment. If governments are using
non-optimal policy instruments (such as sector-scale performance standards),
however, or cannot commit to perfectly credible carbon price signals, Coroll. 2
suggests that second-best policy instrument need to be designed accounting for
different total abatement potentials and different costs of abatement investment
in different sectors (not just the social cost of carbon).
5. Abatement investment vs. abatement cost curves
In this section, we compare the model of abatement investment to a mo-
del based on abatement cost curves. As stated in the introduction, models of
abatement cost curves are popular in the literature on the optimal timing of
mitigation, and abatement cost curves are often used to frame the public de-
bate on climate mitigation policies. Appendix G provides a very simple model
based on abatement cost curves and its analytical resolution. It shows that with
abatement cost curves, the optimal strategy of equalizing marginal abatement
costs across sectors to the unique, exponentially-increasing carbon price simply
leads to increasing abatement similarly in all sectors.
We investigate with both models the optimal cost and timing of emission
reduction, at sector scale, over the 2007-2030 period. We set a policy objective
over this period only,12 and use abatement cost information derived from IPCC
(2007, Fig. SPM 6).13 Because of data limitations and of the short time horizon,
this exercise is not supposed to suggest an optimal climate policy. It aims at
illustrating the impact of two contrasting approaches to model emission reducti-
ons (abatement cost curves or abatement investment) on the optimal abatement
strategy.
12 The infinite-horizon model exposed in sections 2 has to be slightly modified; all the results
exposed in the previous sections hold.
13 The newer IPCC report does not feature an estimation of marginal abatement costs and
potentials across sectors.
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5.1. Specification and calibration
We calibrate the model of abatement cost curves presented in Appendix
G with seven sectors of the economy: energy, industry, buildings, transport,
forestry, agriculture and waste. We assume quadratic abatement costs, which
grants that the abatement cost curves γi are convex, and simplifies the resolution
as marginal abatement costs are linear:
∀i, ∀ai,t ∈ [0, a¯i] γi(ai,t) = 1
2
γmi a
2
i,t
γi
′(ai,t) = γmi a (16)
where γmi are parameters specific to each sector. We calibrate these using emis-
sion reductions corresponding to a 20 $/tCO2 marginal cost in figure SPM.6
in IPCC (2007). We calibrate the sectoral potentials a¯i as the potential at
100 $/tCO2 provided by the IPCC (this is the highest potential provided for
each sector). Numerical values are gathered in Tab. 1.
To calibrate the abatement investment model, we assume quadratic invest-
ment costs:14
∀i, ∀xi,t ≥ 0, ci(xi,t) = 1
2
cmi x
2
i,t
ci
′(xi,t) = cmi xi,t (17)
To calibrate the cmi , we ensure that relative costs, when comparing two sectors,
are equal in the two models, in the sense that:
∀(i, j), c
m
i
cmj
=
γmi
γmj
(18)
This defines all the cmi off by a common multiplicative constant. We calibrate
this multiplicative constant such that the discounted costs of reaching the same
target are equal in the two models (following Grubb et al. 1995). This way,
we aim at reducing differences in optimal strategies to the different models of
emission reductions (cost curves vs. investment).
We call T¯ = 23 yr the time span from the publication date of IPCC (2007)
and the time horizon of IPCC data (2030). We set the discount rate to r =
4%/yr. We constrain the cumulative emissions over the period as:∫ T¯
0
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) ≤ B
14 Vogt-Schilb et al. (2012) studies the role of the investment cost function convexity on the
optimal emission pathway. The more convex the function, the more the social planner spreads
abatement investment over time. If costs are not convex at all, that is ∀xi, c′i(xi) = C, then
the sector i is decarbonized intantanously at the date ti such that µe
rti = (r + δi)C (which
is not realistic as economies cannot switch overnight to zero carbon capital).
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Abatement potential Abatement cost Depreciation rate Investment cost
a¯i [ GtCO2/yr] γ
m
i
[
$/tCO2
GtCO2/yr
]
δi [%/yr] c
m
i
[
$/tCO2
GtCO2/yr
3
]
Waste 0.76 34 3.3 2309
Industry 4.08 17.6 4 1195
Forestry 2.75 15.9 0.8 1080
Agriculture 4.39 11.9 5 808
Transport 2.1 11.6 6.7 788
Energy 3.68 10.3 2.5 699
Buildings 5.99 3.6 1.7 244
Table 1: Values used in the numerical simulations.
To compute the carbon budget B, we chose the Representative Concentration
Pathway RCP 8.5 (from WRI, 2015) as the emission baseline. An emission sce-
nario consistent with the 2◦C target is the RCP3-PD. Remarkably, the difference
in carbon emissions in 2030 between these two RCPs amounts to 24 GtCO2/yr,
which matches
∑
i a¯i as calibrated from IPCC (Tab. 1). We use the diffe-
rence in cumulative emissions from 2007 to 2030 in the two RCPs to calibrate
B = 153 GtCO2.
Finally, we estimate the depreciation rates of capital as the inverse of typical
capital lifetimes in the different sectors of the economy (Philibert, 2007; World
Bank, 2012, Tab. 6.1). The resulting rates of depreciation δi are displayed in
Tab. 1.
We solve the two models numerically in continuous time.15
5.2. Results
Fig. 3 compares the optimal mitigation strategy by the two models and Fig. 4
compares the aggregated pathways in terms of abatement and financial effort.
The two models give the same result in the long run: abatement in each
sector eventually reaches its maximum potential (Fig. 3). By construction, they
also achieve the aggregated abatement target at the same discounted cost. And
the carbon budget implies that the carbon price grows exponentially, regard-
less of how emission reductions are modeled (Fig. 3, upper panels). Moreo-
ver, the models find similar carbon prices, at 17 $/tCO2 with cost curves and
18.6 $/tCO2 with abatement investment, which is not surprising since they are
calibrated on the same carbon budget and such that the total cost is equal in
the two models.
However, the similar carbon prices lead to radically different strategies in
terms of the temporal and sectoral distribution of aggregated abatement and
costs. First, the two frameworks differ in their optimal abatement pathway: in
15 All data and source code, including for figures in the analytical sections and appendixes,
will be available online.
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Abatement cost curves Abatement investment
Figure 3: Comparison of optimal abatement strategies to achieve the same amount of abate-
ment, when the costs from IPCC (2007, SPM6) are understood in an abatement-cost-curve
framework (left) vs. an abatement investment framework (right).
Note: We follow Davis and Socolow (2014) in measuring investment in committed abatement,
(δixi,t in MtCO2/yr) instead of crude investment (xi,t in MtCO2/yr
2). With committed aba-
tement, 1 000 electric vehicles built in 2010 that will each save 11 tCO2 during their lifetime
count as committed abatement of 1 100 tCO2/yr in 2010. In the abatement-cost-curve fra-
mework, there is no equivalent to the physical abatement investments xi,t, since one controls
directly the abatement level ai,t.
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Figure 4: Optimal timing and cost of GHG emissions in the two models (abatement cost
curves vs abatement capital accumulation). When abatement is assumed to be freely chosen
on a cost curve at each time step, the abatement can jump to any amount instantaneously
at the beginning of the period. When abatement requires accumulating capital, abatement
has to grow continuously. The same carbon price (not shown) translates in radically different
short-term expenses in the two models (right panel).
the abatement-cost-curve framework, abatement jumps when the climate policy
is implemented (to emphasize this, we show in the plot that abatement equals
zero between 2005 and the start of the climate policy in 2007). In contrast,
the abatement pathway according to the abatement-investment model starts at
zero and increases continuously (Fig. 3, lower panels).
Second, the two frameworks give different results in terms of the temporal
distribution of abatement costs: with abatement cost curves, abatement expen-
ses start low and increase over time; in the abatement investment framework,
abatement investment starts high and then decreases over time (Fig. 4, right).
In the latter case, abatement investment is concentrated on the short term,
because once all the emissions in a sector have been avoided using abatement
capital, the only cost is that of maintaining the stock of abatement capital.
Importantly, the appropriate level of effort that current decision makers have
to implement is substantially different in the two models: 100 billion dollars of
abatement expenditures versus 300 billion dollars of abatement investment.16
Third, in the abatement-cost-curve framework, the carbon price gives a
straightforward indication on where and when effort should be concentrated.
In contrast, the increasing carbon price is a poor indicator of the optimal dis-
tribution of abatement investment (Fig. 3, higher panels). For instance, in the
abatement cost curve framework, complete decarbonization in the building sec-
tor is realized in 5 years — a somewhat unrealistic result. In the abatement
16 Results from our abatement investment model are compatible with estimates reported
by World Bank (2015), that is between 300 and 400 billion dollars per year of investment
required to meet the 2◦C target, but lower than those reported by McCollum et al. (2013),
at 800 billion dollars per year. Again, we do not claim that ours are optimal pathways to
mitigate climate change: in particular, they only consider a target in the 2007-2030 window.
Considering the long-term objective would impose higher short-term abatement investment.
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investment framework, doing so would imply a very high level of investment
in building retrofit, and therefore very high investment costs. As a result, the
model with abatement investment smooths these investments over 12 years, to
reduce the overall cost of decarbonizing the building sector.
Since costs differ across sectors, this smoothing mechanism is different across
sectors, leading to different marginal abatement investment costs and different
levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC) across sectors. For instance, in this
numerical example, the optimal short-term LCCC is twice as high in the indus-
trial sector than in the building sector even if the climate policy is implemented
with a single carbon price. Facing an abatement option that costs 25 $/tCO2 in
the industrial sector and an abatement option at 15 $/tCO2 in the building sec-
tor, the optimal choice is to invest in the former, not in the latter. Notice that in
the abatement investment sector, sectors are ranked differently at any moment
t, depending on whether one looks at expenses, investment, or abatement.
This numerical application illustrates that using the levelized cost of conser-
ved carbon to compare abatement investment across sectors can be misleading.
It also suggests using abatement cost curves with caution, in particular when
assessing options that involve investment in long-lived capital. (Symmetrically,
the abatement-investment model proposed here should not be used to assess
measures, such as driving less miles per year or reducing air conditioning, that
are best modelled using abatement cost curves.) Finally, it shows that discus-
sing the optimal timing of emission reduction by discussing the time profile of
the social cost of carbon might send the wrong message to policy-makers.17
6. Conclusion
Two types of emission-reduction actions should be distinguished to investi-
gate when and where reducing greenhouse gases emissions. In every sector of
the economy, some actions bring immediate and short-lived environmental be-
17 This practice is common in the literature. Many papers expand the DICE framework
to investigate the impact of particular aspects of the climate-economy system on the optimal
timing of climate mitigation. Examples include Kolstad (1996) and Keller et al. (2004) on
learning that reduces climate uncertainty over time; Bruin et al. (2009) and Bosello et al.
(2010) on how considering adaptation to climate change impacts may affect optimal mitiga-
tion; Hwang et al. (2013) and Lemoine and Traeger (2014) on the impact of fat-tailed risks and
the role of tipping points; and Heal and Millner (2014) on the choice of the appropriate dis-
count rate for climate policy. Dietz and Stern (2014) propose several modifications to DICE,
including the use of a lower discount rate, and a different modelling of climate-change-related
damages. All these papers study the optimal timing of GHG reductions, and in all of them
the question boils down to the question of the optimal carbon price schedule.
Similarly, Jacoby and Sue Wing (1999), van der Zwaan et al. (2002), Fischer et al. (2004) and
Williams (2010) all have models featuring investment in abatement capital. They all present
their results in terms of the carbon price schedule, or the resulting value of abatement capital,
without discussing the implications for immediate investment needs. Finally, a literature on
the optimal distribution of effort across sectors focuses on pinning down sector-specific market
or government failures that would justify different carbon prices in different sectors (e.g., Hoel,
1996; Rosendahl, 2004).
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nefits, such as driving fewer miles per year, using existing gas power plants more
hours per year and existing coal power plants fewer hours per year, or reducing
air conditioning. These are appropriately modeled with abatement cost curves.
For these actions, the increasing carbon price provides direct guidance on where
and when effort to reduce emissions should be allocated.
But in every sector, many actions imply punctual investment and persistent
emission reductions over a long period of time — such as replacing gasoline
vehicles with plug-in hybrid or electric vehicles, replacing fossil-fueled power
plants with renewable power, or retrofitting buildings. These are best modeled
as abatement investment. In these cases, decision-makers have control over the
rate of change of emission reductions, rather than the emission level directly.
For these actions, the carbon price does not provide a direct indication of the
optimal distribution of emission reductions over time and across sectors; one
must also take into account the future value of abatement capital when asses-
sing abatement investment. An increasing carbon price translates into optimal
abatement investment that can be bell-shaped or concentrated over the short
run. Moreover, more investment per abated ton is needed in sectors with larger
abatement potentials and in sectors where abatement capital is more expensive,
even though the same carbon price applies to all sectors. For instance, we find in
an illustrative example that an abatement option at 25 $/tCO2 in the industrial
sector can be preferable to a 15 $/tCO2 option in the building sector.
These results suggest that when assessing abatement investment, the ratio of
marginal investment costs to discounted abatement is a poor indicator of where
abatement investment should be concentrated — such ratio, sometimes labeled
levelized cost of conserved carbon or misleadingly marginal abatement cost, is
however broadly used in the policy debate to compare abatement options, for
instance in marginal abatement cost curves a la McKinsey and Company (2009).
Our results also suggest that the dynamics of abatement capital accumulation
cannot be represented with abatement cost curves. It can thus be misleading to
use models based solely on abatement cost curves to design or assess abatement
strategies, or to investigate the optimal timing or distribution across sectors of
abatement effort.
In terms of policy design, a perfectly credible carbon price imposed to a
well-functioning forward-looking market would in principle trigger the socially-
optimal abatement investment. In practice, while some governments have im-
plemented carbon prices, no existing carbon price is scheduled to grow auto-
matically over the long term (World Bank, 2014).18 Part of the reason could
be that governments have limited ability to commit credibly to future carbon
18 For instance, the British Columbia carbon tax was phased-in, increasing from 10 to
30 C $/tCO2 between 2008 and 2012, but is currently not scheduled to increase any more
(Ministry of Finance, 2015). The European carbon market sets a cap over a few years (the
current phase runs until 2020), but optimal abatement investment in long-lived capital such as
power plants would require allowances to be credibly announced several decades in advance.
Similarly, the French carbon tax is scheduled to increase from 14.5 Euros per ton in 2015 to
100 Euros per ton in 2030, but no further increase is scheduled.
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prices (Brunner et al., 2012). In addition, many existing climate policies, such
as feed-in-tariffs, renewable portfolio mandates, feebates, and performance stan-
dards, are implemented at the sector scale (IEA, 2015) — and many of them
directly incentivize or mandate investment in clean capital, thus not requiring
the government to commit to future carbon prices.
Our results suggest that such policies should be evaluated with care. Second-
best sector-specific policies depend on both the abatement potential and the cost
of abatement investment in each sector, in addition to the social cost of car-
bon. If the mechanisms highlighted in this paper are disregarded, well-designed
sector-scale policies would thus appear to impose excessive costs in the short
term, especially in the sectors that are difficult to decarbonize.
Acknowledgments
We thank Alain Ayong Le Kama, Mook Bangalore, Patrice Dumas, Mari-
anne Fay, Michael Hanemann, Fre´de´ric Ghersi, Louis-Gae¨tan Giraudet, Chris-
tian Gollier, Christophe de Gouvello, Ce´line Guivarch, Jean Charles Hourcade,
Tamaro Kane, Oskar Lecuyer, Baptiste Perissin Fabert, Antonin Pottier, Lio-
nel Ragot, Julie Rozenberg, Franc¸ois Salanie´, Ankur Shah, Nicolas Stern, Mike
Toman, several anonymous referees, seminar participants at Cired, E´cole Poly-
technique, Universite´ Paris Ouest, Paris Sorbonne, Toulouse School of Econo-
mics, Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School, the Joint World Bank –
International Monetary Fund Seminar on Environment and Energy Topics, the
Conference on Pricing Climate Risk held at Center for Environmental Econo-
mics and Sustainability Policy of Arizona State University, and audiences at
the EAERE and the ASSA and SURED conferences for useful comments and
suggestions on various versions of this paper. The remaining errors are the
authors’ responsibility. We acknowledge financial support from Institut pour la
Mobilite´ Durable (Renault and ParisTech), ESMAP (The World Bank), and the
Chaire De´veloppement Durable E´cole Polytechnique-EDF. The views expressed
in this paper are the sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank,
their executive directors, or the countries they represent.
References
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P., Bursztyn, L., Hemous, D., 2012. The environment
and directed technical change. American Economic Review 102 (1), 131–166.
Allen, M. R., Frame, D. J., Huntingford, C., Jones, C. D., Lowe, J. A., Meins-
hausen, M., Meinshausen, N., 2009. Warming caused by cumulative carbon
emissions towards the trillionth tonne. Nature 458 (7242), 1163–1166.
Ambrosi, P., Hourcade, J.-C., Hallegatte, S., Lecocq, F., Dumas, P., Ha Duong,
M., 2003. Optimal control models and elicitation of attitudes towards climate
damages. Environmental Modeling and Assessment 8 (3), 133–147.
22
Audoly, R., Vogt-Schilb, A., Guivarch, C., Pfeiffer, A., 2017. Pathways toward
Zero-Carbon Electricity Required for Climate Stabilization. Inter-American
Development Bank Working Paper 827.
Bosello, F., Carraro, C., De Cian, E., 2010. Climate policy and the optimal ba-
lance between mitigation, adaptation and unavoided damage. Climate Change
Economics 01 (02), 71–92.
Bramoulle´, Y., Olson, L. J., 2005. Allocation of pollution abatement under
learning by doing. Journal of Public Economics 89 (9–10), 1935–1960.
Brock, W. A., Taylor, M. S., 2010. The green solow model. Journal of Economic
Growth 15 (2), 127–153.
Bruin, K. C. d., Dellink, R. B., Tol, R. S. J., 2009. AD-DICE: an implementation
of adaptation in the DICE model. Climatic Change 95 (1-2), 63–81.
Brunner, S., Flachsland, C., Marschinski, R., 2012. Credible commitment in
carbon policy. Climate Policy 12 (2), 255–271.
Davis, S. J., Socolow, R. H., 2014. Commitment accounting of CO2 emissions.
Environmental Research Letters 9 (8), 084018.
del Rio Gonzalez, P., 2008. Policy implications of potential conflicts between
short-term and long-term efficiency in CO2 emissions abatement. Ecological
Economics 65 (2), 292–303.
Dietz, S., Stern, N., 2014. Endogenous growth, convexity of damages and cli-
mate risk: How Nordhaus’ framework supports deep cuts in carbon emissions.
Economic Journal.
Espagne, E., Perrissin-Fabert, B., Pottier, A., Nadaud, F., Dumas, P., 2012. Di-
sentangling the Stern/Nordhaus Controversy: Beyond the Discounting Clash.
Working Paper 2012.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
Fischer, C., Withagen, C., Toman, M., 2004. Optimal investment in clean pro-
duction capacity. Environmental and Resource Economics 28 (3), 325–345.
G7, 2015. Leaders’ Declaration after the G7 Summit held in Germany.
Gould, J. P., 1968. Adjustment costs in the theory of investment of the firm.
The Review of Economic Studies 35 (1), 47.
Goulder, L. H., Mathai, K., 2000. Optimal CO2 abatement in the presence
of induced technological change. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 39 (1), 1–38.
Grubb, M., Chapuis, T., Ha-Duong, M., 1995. The economics of changing
course: Implications of adaptability and inertia for optimal climate policy.
Energy Policy 23 (4-5), 417–431.
23
Heal, G. M., Millner, A., 2014. Agreeing to disagree on climate policy. Procee-
dings of the National Academy of Sciences 111 (10), 3695–3698.
Hoel, M., 1996. Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors? Journal
of Public Economics 59 (1), 17–32.
Hwang, I. C., Reyne`s, F., Tol, R. S. J., 2013. Climate policy under fat-tailed
risk: An application of DICE. Environmental and Resource Economics 56 (3),
415–436.
IEA, 2015. Policies and measures database. Tech. rep.
IPCC, 2007. Summary for policymakers. In: Climate change 2007: Mitiga-
tion. Contribution of working group III to the fourth assessment report of
the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK and New York, USA.
IPCC, 2014a. Annex II: Metrics and methodology. In: Climate Change 2014,
Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the
Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
cambridge university press Edition. [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y.
Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner,
P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlo¨mer, C. von Stechow, T.
Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA.
IPCC, 2014b. Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014, Synthesis
Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Asses-
sment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, cambridge
university press Edition. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY,
USA.
Iyer, G., Hultman, N., Eom, J., McJeon, H., Patel, P., Clarke, L., 2014. Diffusion
of low-carbon technologies and the feasibility of long-term climate targets.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change.
Jaccard, M., Rivers, N., 2007. Heterogeneous capital stocks and the optimal
timing for CO2 abatement. Resource and Energy Economics 29 (1), 1–16.
Jacoby, H. D., Sue Wing, I., 1999. Adjustment Time, Capital Malleability and
Policy Cost. The Energy Journal 20, 73–92.
Jorgenson, D., 1967. The theory of investment behavior. In: Determinants of
investment behavior. NBER.
Keller, K., Bolker, B. M., Bradford, D. F., 2004. Uncertain climate thresholds
and optimal economic growth. Journal of Environmental Economics and Ma-
nagement 48 (1), 723–741.
24
Kolstad, C. D., 1996. Learning and stock effects in environmental regulation:
The case of greenhouse gas emissions. Journal of Environmental Economics
and Management 31 (1), 1–18.
Kverndokk, S., Rosendahl, K. E., 2007. Climate policies and learning by doing:
Impacts and timing of technology subsidies. Resource and Energy Economics
29 (1), 58–82.
Lecocq, F., Hourcade, J., Ha-Duong, M., 1998. Decision making under uncer-
tainty and inertia constraints: sectoral implications of the when flexibility.
Energy Economics 20 (5-6), 539–555.
Lecocq, F., Shalizi, Z., 2014. The economics of targeted mitigation in infrastruc-
ture. Climate Policy 14 (2), 187–208.
Lemoine, D., Traeger, C., 2014. Watch your step: Optimal policy in a tipping
climate. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6 (1), 137–166.
Lucas, Jr., R. E., 1967. Adjustment costs and the theory of supply. Journal of
Political Economy 75 (4), 321–334.
Manne, A. S., Richels, R. G., 1992. Buying greenhouse insurance: the economic
costs of carbon dioxide emission limits. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Matthews, H. D., Gillett, N. P., Stott, P. A., Zickfeld, K., 2009. The proportio-
nality of global warming to cumulative carbon emissions. Nature 459 (7248),
829–832.
McCollum, D., Nagai, Y., Riahi, K., Marangoni, G., Calvin, K., Pietzcker, R.,
Van Vliet, J., Van Der Zwaan, B., 2013. Energy investments under climate
policy: a comparison of global models. Climate Change Economics 04 (04),
1340010.
McKinsey, Company, 2009. Pathways to a low-carbon economy: Version 2 of
the global greenhouse gas abatement cost curve. Tech. rep.
Ministry of Finance, 2015. Carbon tax. Province of British Columbia.
Mussa, M., 1977. External and internal adjustment costs and the theory of
aggregate and firm investment. Economica 44 (174), 163–178.
NCE, 2014. Better growth better climate: the new climate economy report, New
Climate Economy Edition. Washington DC, USA.
Nordhaus, W. D., 1991. To slow or not to slow: The economics of the greenhouse
effect. The Economic Journal 101 (407), 920–937.
Nordhaus, W. D., 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse
gases. Science 258 (5086), 1315–1319.
25
Nordhaus, W. D., Sztorc, P., 2013. DICE 2013R: Introduction and user’s ma-
nual. http://dicemodel.net.
Philibert, C., 2007. Technology penetration and capital stock turnover: Lessons
from IEA scenario analysis. OECD Working Paper.
Pindyck, R. S., 2013. Climate change policy: What do the models tell us?
Journal of Economic Literature 51 (3), 860–872.
Popp, D., 2004. ENTICE: endogenous technological change in the DICE model
of global warming. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
48 (1), 742–768.
Riahi, K., Kriegler, E., Johnson, N., Bertram, C., den Elzen, M., Eom, J.,
Schaeffer, M., Edmonds, J., Isaac, M., Krey, V., Longden, T., Luderer, G.,
Me´jean, A., McCollum, D. L., Mima, S., Turton, H., van Vuuren, D. P.,
Wada, K., Bosetti, V., Capros, P., Criqui, P., Hamdi-Cherif, M., Kainuma,
M., Edenhofer, O., 2015. Locked into Copenhagen pledges — Implications of
short-term emission targets for the cost and feasibility of long-term climate
goals. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 90, Part A, 8–23.
Rosendahl, K. E., 2004. Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of
induced technological change. Journal of Environmental Economics and Ma-
nagement 48 (3), 1099–1121.
Rozenberg, J., Vogt-Schilb, A., Hallegatte, S., 2017. Instrument Choice and
Stranded Assets in the Transition to Clean Capital. Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank Working Paper 782.
Schwoon, M., Tol, R. S., 2006. Optimal CO2-abatement with socio-economic
inertia and induced technological change. The Energy Journal 27 (4).
Slechten, A., 2013. Intertemporal links in cap-and-trade schemes. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 66 (2), 319–336.
Stern, N., 2013. The structure of economic modeling of the potential impacts of
climate change: Grafting gross underestimation of risk onto already narrow
science models. Journal of Economic Literature 51 (3), 838–859.
Stern, N. H., 2006. Stern Review: The economics of climate change. HM treasury
London.
UNFCCC, 2016. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first
session, held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015. FCCC
/CP/2015/10, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
van der Zwaan, B. C. C., Gerlagh, R., G., Klaassen, Schrattenholzer, L., 2002.
Endogenous technological change in climate change modelling. Energy Eco-
nomics 24 (1), 1–19.
26
Vogt-Schilb, A., Hallegatte, S., 2014. Marginal abatement cost curves and the
optimal timing of mitigation measures. Energy Policy 66, 645–653.
Vogt-Schilb, A., Hallegatte, S., de Gouvello, C., 2015. Marginal abatement cost
curves and the quality of emission reductions: a case study on Brazil. Climate
Policy 15 (6), 703–723.
Vogt-Schilb, A., Meunier, G., Hallegatte, S., 2012. How inertia and limited
potentials affect the timing of sectoral abatements in optimal climate policy.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6154.
Wigley, T. M. L., Richels, R., Edmonds, J. A., 1996. Economic and environ-
mental choices in the stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Nature
379 (6562), 240–243.
Williams, J. H., DeBenedictis, A., Ghanadan, R., Mahone, A., Moore, J., Mor-
row, W. R., Price, S., Torn, M. S., 2012. The technology path to deep gr-
eenhouse gas emissions cuts by 2050: The pivotal role of electricity. Science
335 (6064), 53–59.
Williams, R., 2010. Setting the initial time-profile of climate policy: The eco-
nomics of environmental policy phase-ins. Working Paper 16120, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
World Bank, 2012. Inclusive green growth : the pathway to sustainable deve-
lopment. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
World Bank, 2014. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2014. The World Bank,
Washington DC, USA.
World Bank, 2015. Decarbonizing Development: Three Steps to a Zero-Carbon
Future. World Bank Publications.
WRI, 2015. CAIT 2.0: WRI’s climate data explorer. World Resources Institute
http://cait2.wri.org.
Zickfeld, K., Eby, M., Matthews, H. D., Weaver, A. J., 2009. Setting cumulative
emissions targets to reduce the risk of dangerous climate change. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (38), 16129–16134.
Appendix A. Optimal accumulation of abatement capital
Appendix A.1. Hamiltonian
The Hamiltonian associated with (6) reads:
H(xt, at,mt) = e
−rt
(
c(xt) + λt (at − εref ) + νt (δat − xt)
+ µt (εref − at) + φt (mt −B)
) (A.1)
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Appendix A.2. First order conditions
The first order conditions read:
∂H
∂xt
= 0 ⇐⇒ c′(xt) = νt (A.2)
∂H
∂at
− d (e
−rtνt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ ν˙t − (δ + r)νt = λt − µt (A.3)
∂H
∂m
+
d (e−rtµt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ µ˙t − rµt = −φt (A.4)
Where νt is the current value of abatement capital, µ is the current cost of
carbon, and λt is the current social cost of the maximum abatement potential.
19
Equations (A.3) and (A.2) can be rearranged as:
(r + δ) c′(xt)− dc
′(xt)
dt
= (µt − λt) (A.5)
Appendix A.3. Complementary slackness conditions
The following complementary slackness condition implies that the carbon
price grows at the discount rate before the steady state:
∀t, φt(B −mt) = 0
mt < B =⇒ µt = µert (from A.4) (A.6)
Equation (A.6) is similar to a Hotelling rule: here, the carbon budget is
analogous to a nonrenewable resource. The other complementary slackness con-
ditions is
∀t, (at − εref )λt = 0 (A.7)
Appendix A.4. Steady state
We call T the date when the carbon budget is reached. After T , emission
are nill and investment is used to counterbalance depreciation:
∀t ≥ T, m˙t = 0 =⇒ at = εref =⇒ xt = δεref (A.8)
19 Note that the FOCs do not depend on εref , showing that the assumption that εref is
constant over time does not impact the basic dynamics of the model.
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Appendix A.5. The optimal temporal profile of abatement and investment
In this subsection, we show that along the optimal trajectory, abatement
capital increases over time before T ; and that optimal investment is either bell-
shaped or decreasing with respect to time and so is the marginal investment
cost, even though the carbon price is exponentially increasing. We first show
that
Lemma 1. if at < eref then xt is either decreasing or increasing then decrea-
sing,
then we show that
Lemma 2. at is increasing and is strictly lower than eref before the finite date
T .
Lemma 1 formalizes one of the main messages from this paper: a growing carbon
price does not translate into growing abatement investment. Lemma 2 reflects
that since the only reason to invest in abatement is to reach the carbon budget,
it cannot be optimal to abate all emissions before the date when the carbon
budget is reached.
Proof. • Lemma 1 If at < eref , equation A.5 may be re-arranged as:
∀t s.t. at < εref , dc
′(xt)
dt
= (r + δ) c′(xt)− µert (A.9)
Fig. 1 shows that (A.9) results in Lemma 1. Here we also provide a formal
proof. First, notice that since dc
′(xt)
dt = x˙t
d2c(x)
dx2 and we assume that c is
strictly convex, investment xt and marginal investment costs c
′(xt) have
the same temporal evolution.
Equation (A.9) implies that if optimal investment is decreasing at a date
θ, it continues to decrease ∀t > θ s.t. at < εref . Indeed dc
′(xt)
dt < 0 =⇒
(r + δ) c′(xθ) < µerθ. In that case, c′(xθ) decreases over time, and µerθ
always increases over time, so that (r + δ) c′(xθ) remains lower than µerθ
and dc
′(xt)
dt remains lower than 0.
Now consider the case where c′(xt) is increasing. In that case, it cannot
increase indefinitely. Since dc
′(xt)
dt > 0 =⇒ (r + δ) c′(xt) > µert. Ever
increasing investment would thus lead to infinite abatement capital, higher
than εref . This means that if c
′(xt) increases over time, then there is a
θ such that investment stop increasing, that is dc
′(xt)
dt = 0. Deriving A.9
with respect to time shows that dc
′(xt)
dt = 0 =⇒ d
2c′(xt)
dt2 < 0, meaning c
′
has reached its maximum at θ. Immediately after θ, c′ starts decreasing.
Sumarizing, if investment starts decreasing, it will decrease as long as A.9
holds, and ifis starts increasing, it will eventually cross the carbon price,
and decrease afterward as long as A.9 holds. (Fig. 1). 
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• Lemma 2 Let us now show that at is increasing ∀t < T . First, note that
at starts from 0 and is necessarily increasing at first. Second, if at is
not continuously increasing, then there is a date t such that a˙t = 0 and
a¨t ≤ 0. Then, at this date a˙t = xt − δat and a¨t = x˙t − δa˙t = x˙t, so x˙t ≤ 0
and xt decreases for all future dates (Lemma 1). This implies that at also
decreases at all future dates (otherwise, reproducing the reasoning would
give a date τ > t with x˙τ ≥ 0), and mt ends up above B, a contradiction.
at is thus steadily increasing over time. A direct consequence is that
∀t < T, at < εref . Finally, let us show that abatement reaches its potential
in finite time, T < +∞: otherwise (A.9) is satisfied at all dates, and
c′(xt) = c′(x0)e(r+δ)t − µe
rt
δ
(
eδt − 1)
which tends either to +∞ or −∞, a contradiction .
Since emissions equal zero after T and strictly positive before, the social cost
of the maximum potential is also zero before the steady state:
∀t < T, at < εref and λt = 0 (A.10)
∀t ≥ T, at = εref and λt ≥ 0
Appendix A.6. Solving for c′
Before T , (A.10) allows simplifying (A.5) to:
∀t < T, (r + δ) c′(xt)− dc
′(xt)
dt
= µert (A.11)
The solutions of this first order linear differential equation read:
∀t < T, c′(xt) = e(r+δ)t
∫ T
t
e−(r+δ)θµerθ dθ + e(r+δ)t C (A.12)
Where C is a constant. Any C defines an investment pathway that is consistent
with the exponentially growing carbon price (A.11). The optimal investment
pathways also satisfies a boundary condition: the full potential must be reached
at the date T .
Appendix A.7. Boundary conditions
After T , at is constant and the investment xt is used to counterbalance the
depreciation of abatement capital.
c′(xT ) = c′ (δεref ) (from eq. A.8) (A.13)
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Appendix A.8. Optimal marginal investment costs (MICs)
Injecting A.13 in A.12 and re-arranging, one gets:
∀t < T,
c′(xt) = µert
∫ T
t
e−δ(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(T−t) c′ (δεref ) (A.14)
which can also be written as:
c′(xt) =
∫ T
t
µerθe−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ +
∫ ∞
T
(r + δ) c′ (δεref ) e−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ
(A.15)
In equation A.15, output from the marginal, deprecating, abatement capital
is valued at the current carbon price before T , and valued at the replacement
cost of abatement capital c′ (δεref ) after T .20
Appendix A.9. The forgone-opportunity effect
Here we explain how the previous result compares to Slechten (2013). Equa-
tion (A.15) can be rewritten to show that the marginal abatement investment
cost c′(xt) can be expressed as the sum of three terms: (1) the value E of avoi-
ded emissions along the full lifetime of the investment; (2) the value O of the
forgone opportunity, since each investment in abatement capital reduces future
investment opportunities; and (3) the value K of abatement capital in the long
run:
∀t < T, c′(xt) = µert
∫ ∞
t
e−δ(θ−t) dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
E
− µert
∫ ∞
T
e−δ(θ−t) dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
O
(A.16)
+ e−(r+δ)(T−t) c′ (δεref )︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
(A.17)
The second term O echoes previous findings by Slechten (2013) and can be
interpreted as a forgone-opportunity effect. The limited potential εref behaves
here like a non-renewable resource, an abatement deposit. After T , accumula-
ting more abatement capital does not allow to reduce emissions. The value O of
this forgone opportunity is the value of the GHG that the maximum potential
prevents to save after T . Slechten (2013) does not have an analog to K as she
neglects depreciation.
20 c′
(
δεref
)
is the replacement cost of the capital after T . It is the cost one has to pay
to buy one unit of abatement capital and keep it for its lifetime. (r + δ) c′
(
δεref
)
is the
corresponding rental cost, since dc′(xt)/dt = 0 after T . It is the price one has to pay for
renting abatement capital for one unit of time.
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Appendix B. Optimal investment dynamics are similar under cost-
effectiveness and cost-benefit
Here, we clarify that the results exposed in the previous section do not
depend on the fact that we used a cost-effectiveness analysis instead of a cost-
benefit analysis.
Consider the following problem, where a social planner minimizes the sum
of abatement investment costs and the cost of climate change impacts:
min
xt
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
c(xt) + d(mt)
)
dt (B.1)
subject to m˙t = εref − at (µt)
a˙t = xt − δat (νt)
at ≤ εref (λt)
Where d(mt) is an increasing and convex function that captures damages
from climate change impacts.
The Hamiltonian associated with (B.1) reads:
H(xt, at,mt) = e
−rt
(
c(xt) + d(mt) + λt (at − εref ) + νt (δat − xt)
+ µt (εref − at)
) (B.2)
The first order conditions read:
∂H
∂xt
= 0 ⇐⇒ c′(xt) = νt (B.3)
∂H
∂at
− d (e
−rtνt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ ν˙t − (δ + r)νt = λt − µt (B.4)
∂H
∂m
+
d (e−rtµt)
dt
= 0 ⇐⇒ µ˙t = rµt − d′(mt) (B.5)
Compared to the case of a carbon budget, the optimal carbon price is now more
complex, and cannot be expressed analytically in general. Fischer et al. (2004)
study the possible temporal profiles of the carbon price resulting from (B.5). In
the case relevant to this paper, the optimal carbon price first increases over time
and then tends to a constant value at the steady state, once GHG concentration
in the atmosphere have stabilized at an endogenous level B? (see figures 2 and
3 in Fischer et al., 2004).
In this paper, we focus on how the carbon price translates to optimal aba-
tement investment (and how optimal investment differs across sectors). Irre-
spective of the particular shape of the carbon price, it remains the case that
before the steady state, emissions are positive, λt = 0, and (B.3) and (B.4) can
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be integrated so as to express optimal investment as a function of the carbon
price µt as:
∀t ≤ T,
c′(xt) =
∫ T
t
µθe
−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ +
∫ ∞
T
(r + δ) c′ (δεref ) e−(δ+r)(θ−t) dθ (B.6)
In particular, Prop. 2 holds (as does Coroll. 2).
Yet another equivalent problem is the following, where a social planner (or
any equivalent decentralized procedure) faces an exogenous carbon price µt on
unabated emissions:
min
xt
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
c(xt) + µt(εref − at)
)
dt (B.7)
subject to a˙t = xt − δat (νt)
at ≤ εref (λt)
This problem also leads to optimal marginal abatement investment costs to be
valued at the carbon price before the steady state, and at the replacement cost
of abatement capital after the steady state — that is, (B.6) and Prop. 2 (and
Coroll. 2) all remain true.
Appendix C. Proof of the expression of the LCCC `t
Let h be a marginal physical investment in abatement capital made at time
t in sector i (expressed in tCO2/yr per year). It generates an infinitesimal
abatement flux that starts at h at time t and decreases exponentially at rate δi,
leading to discounted abatement ∆A (expressed in tCO2):
∆A =
∫ ∞
θ=t
er(θ−t)h e−δi(θ−t) dθ (C.1)
=
h
r + δ
(C.2)
This additional investment h brings current investment from xt to (xt+h). The
additional cost ∆C (expressed in $) that it brings reads:
∆C = c(xt + h)− c(xt) =
h→0
h c′(xt) (C.3)
The levelized cost of conserved carbon `t is the ratio of additional costs by
additional discounted abatement:
`t =
∆C
∆A
(C.4)
`t = (r + δ) c
′(xt) (C.5)
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Appendix D. An alternative understanding of the marginal implicit
rental cost of abatement capital
Figure D.5: Top row: from a given investment pathway (xt) leading to the abatement pathway
(at), one additional unit of investment at time θ has two effects: it saves GHG, and brings
forward the date when the maximum potential εref is reached (T → T˜ ). Bottom row: saving
one more unit of GHG at a date θ without changing the rest of the abatement pathway, as in
(a˜t), requires to invest one more unit at θ and (1− δ dθ) less at θ + dθ, as (x˜t) does.
From an existing investment pathway (xt) leading to an abatement pathway
(at), the social planner may increase investment by one unit at time θ and
immediately reduce investment by 1 − δ dθ at the next period θ + dθ. The
resulting investment schedule (x˜t) leads to an abatement pathway (a˜t) that
abates one supplementary unit of GHG between θ and θ+ dθ (Fig. D.5). Moving
from (xt) to (x˜t) costs:
P = 1
dθ
[
c′(xθ)− (1− δ dθ)
(1 + r dθ)
c′(xθ+ dθ)
]
(D.1)
For marginal time lapses, this tends to :
P −−−−→
dθ→0
(r + δ) c′(xθ)− dc
′(xθ)
dθ
(D.2)
P tends to the cost of renting one unit of abatement capital at θ.
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Appendix E. Optimal allocation of abatement investment
The Hamiltonian associated with (13) reads:
H(xi,t, ai,t,mt) = e
−rt
(∑
i
ci(xi,t) +
∑
i
λi,t (ai,t − a¯i) +
∑
i
νi,t (δiai,t − xt)
+µt
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) + φt (mt −B)
)
(E.1)
The first order conditions read ∀(i, t):
ci
′(xi,t) = νi,t (∂xi,t) (E.2)
ν˙i,t − (δi + r)νi,t = λi,t − µt (∂ai,t) (E.3)
µ˙t − rµt = −φt (∂mt) (E.4)
Where νi,t is the present value of investment in low carbon capital, µ is the
present cost of carbon, and λi,t is the social cost of the sectoral potential. The
steady state is reached at a date Tm when the carbon budget is reached. Af-
ter this date, emissions equal zero in every sector and investment is used to
counterbalance depreciation:
m˙t = 0 =⇒ ∀i, ai,t = a¯i =⇒ xi,t = δia¯i (E.5)
Denoting Ti the date when all emissions in sector i are capped (∀i ≥ Ti, ai,t =
a¯i), it is easy to establish that Tm = maxi(Ti) (adapting the resolution from
Appendix A). The complementary slackness conditions mean that the carbon
price grows at the discount rate before the steady state:
∀t < Tm, mt < B and φt = 0 (E.6)
=⇒ µt = µert (E.7)
and the social costs of the sectoral potentials are zero before the respective dates
Ti:
∀t < Ti, ai,t < a¯i and λi,t = 0 (E.8)
The first order conditions can be re-arranged as:
∀(i, t), (r + δi) ci′(xi,t)− dci
′(xi,t)
dt
= µert − λi,t (E.9)
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Figure E.6: Two different investment trajectories corresponding to two sectors with the same
depreciation rate crossing after one has reached its maximum abatement potential.
Following the demonstration for the case of one single sector (Appendix A)
yields:
ci
′(xi,t) = µert
∫ Ti
t
e−δi(θ−t) dθ + e−(δ+r)(Ti−t) c′i (δia¯i) (E.10)
=
∫ Ti
t
µerθe−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ +
∫ ∞
Ti
(r + δi) c
′
i (δia¯i) e
−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ (E.11)
The fact that the dates Ti differ across sectors is easily derived from the demon-
strations of the corollaries in the next subsection.
Appendix E.1. Proof of Coroll. 1
Here we demonstrate Coroll. 1. We first show that two investment profiles
cannot cross before one of the sector has reached its maximum potential. One
is therefore always higher than the other. We then show that the highest inves-
tment profile corresponds to the most expensive sector, or the one with higher
abatement potential.
As a lemma, note that the Euler equation
∀i,∀t < Ti, dci
′(xi,t)
dt
= (r + δi)ci
′(xi,t)− µert (E.12)
implies that if two sectors have the same depreciation rate δi, if their investment
trajectories meet before one of the sectors is decarbonized, then they must be
equal for all times before one of the sector is decarbonized:
∀(i, j), δi = δj and ∃t× ≤ min(Ti, Tj) s.t. c′i(xi,t×) = c′j(xj,t×) (E.13)
=⇒ ∀t ≤ min(Ti, Tj), c′i(xi,t) = c′j(xj,t) (E.14)
This means that the only possibility for two optimal investment trajectories
— corresponding to two sectors with the same depreciation rate — to cross at
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one point in time is after one has reached its maximum abatement potential
(Fig. E.6).
Let us prove Coroll. 1(i):
Proof. Let two sectors {1, 2} be such that they exhibit the same investment
cost function, the same depreciation rate, but different abatement potentials:
∀x > 0, c′1(x) = c′2(x), δ1 = δ2 = δ, a¯1 > a¯2
In the long term, the largest sector is above the small one:
∀t ≥ max(T1, T2), (r + δ)c′1(δa¯1) > (r + δ)c′2(δa¯2) (E.15)
Suppose that the two investment pathways cross at t× ∈ [T1, T2],21 such that
(Fig. E.6):
{
∀t < t×, c′1(x1,t) ≤ c′2(x2,t)
∀t > t×, c′1(x1,t) > c′2(x2,t)
(E.16)
=⇒ ∀t < T1, x1,t ≤ x2,t
=⇒
∫ T1
0
x1,t e
−δ(T2−t)dt = a¯1 <
∫ T1
0
x2,t e
−δ(T2−t)dt = a2,T1
which is incompatible with the constraint that a2,T2 ≤ a¯2 and the assumption
that a¯1 < a¯2. As a result, it is impossible that c
′
1(x1,t) and c
′
2(x2,t) cross, and:
∀t, c′1(x1,t) > c′2(x2,t) (E.17)
Coroll. 1 (ii) tackles the similar case of two sectors differing only for the cost
of their abatement capital:
∀x > 0, c′1(x) < c′2(x) (while a¯1 = a¯2 and δ1 = δ2)
The proof is similar: (E.15) holds and (E.16) would imply that a¯2 = a2,T2 >
a¯1 = a¯2.
Note that Coroll. 1 does not prevent any two optimal sectoral investment
pathways to cross: the situation pictured in Fig. E.6 may happen for two
sectors which differ in cost and abatement potential in different directions
(c′1 > c
′
2 and a¯1 < a¯2) and for sectors for which the depreciation rate of abate-
ment capital differs (δ1 6= δ2).
21 Because
dci
′(xi,t)
dt
< 0 in the vicinity of Ti, T1 > T2 is not possible if the curves cross
(Fig. E.6)
37
Appendix E.2. Generalization to arbitrary baseline emissions
In this appendix, we relax the assumption that sectoral emissions are con-
stant to a¯i. The general result holds: marginal investment costs differ across
sectors, the levelized cost of conserved carbon is different from the social cost of
carbon, and it is higher in the sectors that are more difficult to decarbonize. Re-
laxing the assumption of constant emissions just means that it is more difficult
to define which sectors are more difficult to decarbonize.
Replacing a¯i with arbitrary positive emissions εi,t in problem (13) yields the
following Hamiltonian:
H(xi,t, ai,t,mt) = e
−rt
(∑
i
ci(xi,t) +
∑
i
λi,t (ai,t − εi,t) +
∑
i
νi,t (δiai,t − xt)
+µt
∑
i
(a¯i − ai,t) + φt (mt −B)
)
(E.18)
It is easy to verify that first order conditions (E.2), (E.3) and (E.4) are unchan-
ged, as well as the result on the shape of the carbon price (E.6).
However, the slackness condition λi,t (ai,t − εi,t) = 0 does not result any
more in one single date Ti in each sector such that ai,t < εi,t ⇐⇒ t < Ti.
In general, we can only say that during some intervals of time, ai,t < εi,t, and
during other time intervals, ai,t = εi,t. Also, on time intervals when ai,t = εi,t,
investment is now given by xi,t = δiεi,t + ε˙i,t (in lieu of δia¯i).
The good news is that the more general result holds: marginal investment
costs are given by the value of abated carbon when net emissions are positive,
and the cost of maintaining emissions at their maximum otherwise. (E.11)
becomes:
ci
′(xi,t) =
∫
t|ai,t<εi,t
µerθe−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ
+
∫
t|ai,t=εi,t
(r + δi) c
′
i (δiεi,t + ε˙i,t) e
−(δi+r)(θ−t) dθ (E.19)
It thus remains the case that if a sector is more difficult to decarbonize, in the
sense that the time set under the first integral is longer, and that the mainte-
nance cost in the second integral is higher, then more investment should go to
that sector.
To give a more concrete example, assume two sectors 1,2 have the same
investment cost function c1 = c2 = c, the same depreciation rate δ1 = δ2 = δ,
but different baseline emission ∀t, ε1,t > ε2,t. Also assume that emission paths
are such that the optimal decarbonization schedule follows a clear transition-
then-maintenance pattern, in the sense that ∀i ∈ {1, 2},∃Ti such that ai,t <
εi,t ⇐⇒ t < Ti. In that case, all the reasoning in Appendix E.1 holds, and the
optimal investment cost is higher in sector 1:
∀t, c′1(x1,t) > c′2(x2,t)
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Appendix F. A perfectly-credible carbon price can decentralize the
optimal abatement strategy
Take the point of view of the owner of one polluting equipment in a sector i,
facing the credibly announced carbon price schedule µert. One question for this
owner is when should the equipment be retrofitted or replaced with zero-carbon
capital. The following corollary illustrates that the question is easily answered
if agents correctly anticipate the prices of carbon and abatement capital:
Corollary 3. Along the optimal pathway, individual forward-looking agents in
each sector i are indifferent between investing in abatement capital at any time
before Ti.
Proof. Let τ be the date when the agent invests in abatement capital. Before
τ , the agent pays the carbon price. At τ , she invests in one unit of abatement
capital at the price c′i(xi,τ ). At each time period t after τ , she has to maintain
its abatement capital, which costs δic
′
i(xi,t). The total discounted cost Vi(τ) of
this strategy reads:
Vi(τ) = µτ + e
−rτ c′i(xi,τ ) +
∫ ∞
τ
e−rtδic′i(xi,t)dt (F.1)
Let us derivative the cost V with respect to the decision variable τ :
V ′i (τ) = µ+ e
−rτ
(
c′i(xi,τ )− r
d
dτ
c′i(xi,τ )
)
− e−rτδic′i(xi,τ )
= e−rτ
(
(r + δi) c
′
i(xi,τ )−
d
dτ
c′i(xi,τ )− µerτ
)
V ′i (τ) = e
−rτλi,τ (from eq. E.9)
This last equations implies that V ′i (τ) equals zero for any τ ≤ Ti, and is positive
afterwards (E.8). 
Coroll. 3 means that the optimal investment pathways can be decentralized to
a market equilibrium by imposing a perfectly credible carbon price path µert to
forward-looking investors.
Appendix G. Overview of the abatement-cost-curve model
Since the seminal contribution by Nordhaus (1992), a frequent approach to
derive the optimal timing of mitigation strategies is to use an abatement cost
curve. In this section we find that in this framework the optimal timing and cost
of GHG reductions is essentially the same thing as the exponentially-increasing
carbon price.
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Appendix G.1. An abatement cost curve model
The cost of emission abatement at time t is linked to the abatement at
through an abatement cost curve γ. The function γ is classically convex, positive
and twice differentiable:
∀at, γ′′(at) > 0 (G.1)
γ′(at) > 0
γ(at)0
The basic idea behind the abatement cost curve is that some potentials for
emission reductions are cheap (e.g. building insulation pays for itself thanks
to subsequent savings), while other are more expensive (e.g. upgrading power
plants with carbon capture and storage). If potentials are exploited in the merit
order — from the cheapest to the most expensive — the marginal cost of doing
so γ′(at) is increasing in at, and γ(at) is convex.
A social planner determines when to abate in order to minimize abatement
costs discounted at a given rate r, under the constraints set by the abatement
potential and the carbon budget:
min
at
∫ ∞
0
e−rt γ (at) dt (G.2)
subject to at ≤ εref (λt)
m˙t = εref − at (µt)
mt ≤ B (φt)
We denoted in parentheses the co-state variables and Lagrangian multipliers.
Appendix G.2. Result in the abatement cost curve framework
In the abatement cost curve framework, the optimal abatement cost strategy
is to implement abatement options such that the marginal abatement cost is
equal to the carbon price µert at each point in time, until the potential εref is
reached at a date T (Appendix G.3):
γ′(at) =

0 t ≤ t0
µert t0 < t < T
γ′(εref ) t ≥ T
(G.3)
Where t0 is the date when the social planner implements the carbon price
(Fig. G.7).
Many contributions based on abatement cost curves and numerical optimiza-
tion factor in some climate change dynamics and damages from climate change,
including the DICE model and its extensions discussed in the introduction, wit-
hout changing these general results.
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Figure G.7: Optimal timing and costs of abatement in the abatement-cost-curve framework.
Left: Before the potential is reached, abatement efforts are equal to the carbon price and
grow over time. Right: When the social planner imposes a carbon price at t0, the level of
abatement “jumps”.
In the abatement cost curve framework, both the optimal abatement efforts
γ(at) and the abatement level at thus increase over time. Moreover, abatement
decisions can be made at each time step independently, based only on the current
carbon price µert and the abatement cost curve γ. In particular, the level of
abatement jumps when the carbon price is implemented (Fig. G.7). Such jumps
are common in the literature on the optimal timing of mitigation. For instance,
the last version of DICE finds that the least-cost pathway to reach the 2◦C target
starting a policy in 2010 is to jump from 0% to 35% of emission reductions in
five years, between 2010 and 2015 — see Figure 9 in Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013)
— which we believe is unrealistic.22
The (implicit) assumption that abatement can be decided independently at
each time step is only valid in cases where abatement action is paid for and
delivers emission reduction when the decision is taken, such as driving less or
reducing air conditioning. In many cases, such as upgrading to more efficient
vehicles or retrofitting buildings, costs are mainly paid when the decision is
taken, while annual emissions are reduced over several decades. These actions
are better modelled as abatement investment.23
Appendix G.3. Detailed resolution
The Hamiltonian associated with (G.2) reads:
22 An other example is Schwoon and Tol (2006), who interestingly allow explicitly for such
jumps, in a model that would otherwise be close to the abatement investment model presented
in section 1.
23 In a recent working paper, Rozenberg et al. (2017) propose a model to analyse instan-
taneous reductions and abatement investment in the same framework (but their model does
not allow to compare investment in different sectors).
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H(at,mt) = e
−rt
(
γ(at) + λt (at − εref ) + µt (εref − at) + φt (mt −B)
)
(G.4)
The first order conditions are:
(∂at) γ
′(at) = (µt − λt) (G.5)
(∂mt) µ˙t − rµt = −φt (G.6)
The steady state is reached at a date T when m˙t = 0, that is when the
abatement potential εref is reached, such that:
∀t < T, at < εref and mt < B
∀t ≥ T, at = εref and mt = B
As the associated Lagrangian multiplier, φt is zero before the carbon budget is
reached (complementary slackness condition):
∀t, φt · (mt −B) = 0
=⇒ ∀t < T, φt = 0 (G.7)
This means that the present value of carbon µt is constant while the carbon
budget has not been reached (G.6):
∀t < T, µt = µert (G.8)
For the same reason, λt is zero before the sectoral potential becomes binding:
∀t, λt · (at − εref ) = 0
=⇒ ∀t < T, λt = 0 (G.9)
Combining (G.5), (G.8), and (G.9), one gets (G.3).
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